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Washington and the Riddle of Peace
英语 BooksWhale 版本 · H. G. Wells
Wells reports on the Washington Conference and examines naval armaments, Pacific diplomacy, and the prospects for peace after the First World War.
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Washington and the Riddle of Peace
Wells reports on the Washington Conference and examines naval armaments, Pacific diplomacy, and the prospects for peace after the First World War. The twenty-nine papers consider the positions of the United States, Britain, France, China, and Japan. They connect the conference’s negotiations with the wider difficulty of building durable international institutions.
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The original work by H. G. Wells is in the public domain in the United States. This edition uses the historical English text from Project Gutenberg and excludes modern editorial material.
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预览章节INTRODUCTION阅读预览
These twenty-nine papers do not profess to be a record or description of the Washington Conference. They give merely the impressions and fluctuating ideas of one visitor to that conference. They show the reaction of that gathering upon a mind keenly set upon the idea of an organized world peace; they record phases of enthusiasm, hope, doubt, depression and irritation. They have scarcely been touched, except to correct a word or a phrase here or there; they are dated; in all essentials they are the articles just as they appeared in the New York World, the Chicago Tribune, and the other American and European papers which first gave them publicity. It is due to the enterprise and driving energy of the New York World, be it noted, that they were ever written at all. But in spite of the daily change and renewal of mood and attitude, inevitable under the circumstances, they do tell a consecutive story; they tell of the growth and elaboration of a conviction of how things can be done, and of how they need to be done, if our civilization is indeed to be rescued from the dangers that encompass it and set again upon the path of progress. They record—and in a very friendly and appreciative spirit—the birth and unfolding of the “Association of Nations” idea, the Harding idea, of world pacification, they note some of the peculiar circumstances of that birth, and they study the chief difficulties on its way to realization. It is, the writer believes, the most practical and hopeful method of attacking this riddle of the Sphinx that has hitherto been proposed.
H. G. Wells.
预览章节I THE IMMENSITY OF THE ISSUE AND THE TRIVIALITY OF MEN预览
Washington, Nov. 7.
The conference nominally for the limitation of armaments that now gathers at Washington may become a cardinal event in the history of mankind. It may mark a turning point in human affairs or it may go on record as one of the last failures to stave off the disasters and destruction that gather about our race.
In August, 1914, an age of insecure progress and accumulation came to an end. When at last, on the most momentous summer night in history, the long preparations of militarism burst their bounds and the little Belgian village Vise went up in flames, men said: “This is a catastrophe.” But they found it hard to anticipate the nature of the catastrophe. They thought for the most part of the wounds and killing and burning of war and imagined that when at last the war was over we should count our losses and go on again much as we did before 1914.
As well might a little shopkeeper murder his wife in the night and expect to carry on “business as usual” in the morning. “Business as usual”—that was the catchword in Britain in 1914; of all the catchwords of the world it carries now the heaviest charge of irony.
The catastrophe of 1914 is still going on. It does not end; it increases and spreads. This winter more people will suffer dreadful things and more people will die untimely through the clash of 1914 than suffered and died in the first year of the war. It is true that the social collapse of Russia in 1917 and the exhaustion of food and munitions in Central Europe in 1918 produced a sort of degradation and enfeeblement of the combatant efforts of our race and that a futile conference at Versailles settled nothing, with an air of settling everything, but that was no more an end to disaster than it would be if a man who was standing up and receiving horrible wounds were to fall down and writhe and bleed in the dust. It would be merely a new phase of disaster. Since 1919 this world has not so much healed its wounds as realized its injuries.
Chief among these injuries is the progressive economic breakdown, the magnitude of which we are only beginning to apprehend. The breakdown is a real decay that spreads and spreads. In a time of universal shortage there is an increasing paralysis in production; and there is a paralysis of production because the monetary system of the world, which was sustained by the honest co-operation of Governments, is breaking down. The fluctuations in the real value of money become greater and greater and they shake and shatter the entire fabric of social co-operation.
Our civilization is, materially, a cash and credit system, dependent on men’s confidence in the value of money. But now money fails us and cheats us; we work for wages and they give us uncertain paper. No one now dare make contracts ahead; no one can fix up a stable wages agreement; no one knows what one hundred dollars or francs or pounds will mean in two years’ time.
What is the good of saving? What is the good of foresight? Business and employment become impossible. Unless money can be steadied and restored, our economic and social life will go on disintegrating, and it can be restored only by a world effort.
But such a world effort to restore business and prosperity is only possible between governments sincerely at peace, and because of the failure of Versailles there is no such sincere peace. Everywhere the Governments, and notably Japan and France, arm. Amidst the steady disintegration of the present system of things, they prepare for fresh wars, wars that can have only one end—an extension of the famine and social collapse that have already engulfed Russia to the rest of the world.
预览章节II ARMAMENTS THE FUTILITY OF MERE LIMITATION预览
Washington, Nov. 8.
It would seem that the peculiar circumstances of its meeting demand that the Washington Conference should begin with a foregone futility, the discussion of the limitation of armaments and of the restrictions of warfare in certain directions, while nations are still to remain sovereign and free to make war and while there exists no final and conclusive court of decision for international disputes except warfare.
A number of people do really seem to believe that we can go on with all the various states of the earth still as sovereign and independent of each other as wild beasts in a jungle, with no common rule and no common law, and yet that we can contrive it that they will agree to make war only in a mild and mitigated fashion, after due notice and according to an approved set of regulations. Such ideas are quite seriously entertained and they are futile and dangerous ideas. A committee of the London League of Nations Union, for example, has been debating with the utmost gravity whether the use of poison gas and the sinking of neutral ships to enforce a blockade should be permitted and whether “all modern developments” in warfare should not be abolished. “The feasibility of preventing secret preparations and the advantages of surprise were also considered.” It is as if warfare was a game.
It is a little difficult to reason respectfully against that sort of project. One is moved rather to add helpful suggestions in the same vein. As for example, that no hostilities shall be allowed to begin or continue except in the presence of a League of Nations referee, who shall be marked plainly on the chest and pants with the red cross of Geneva and who—for the convenience of aircraft—shall carry an open sunshade similarly adorned. He shall be furnished with a powerful whistle or hand trumpet audible above the noise of modern artillery, and military operations shall be at once arrested when this whistle is blown. Contravention of the rules laid down by the League of Nations shall be penalized according to the gravity of the offense, with penalties ranging from, let us say, an hour’s free bombardment of the offender’s position to the entire forces of the enemy being addressed very severely by the referee and ordered off the field.
In the event of either combatant winning the war, outright by illegitimate means, it might further be provided that such combatant should submit to a humiliating peace, just as if the war had been lost.
Unhappily war is not a game but the grimmest of realities, and no power on earth exists to prevent a nation which is fighting for existence against another nation from resorting to any expedient however unfair, cruel and barbarous to enforce victory or avert disaster. Success justifies every expedient in warfare, and you cannot prevent that being so. A nation, hoping to win and afterward make friends with its enemy or solicitous for the approval of some powerful neutral, may conceivably refrain from effective but objectionable expedients, but that is a voluntary and strategic restraint. The fact remains that war is an ultimate and illimitable thing; a war that can be controlled is a war that could have been stopped or prevented. If our race can really bar the use of poison gas it can bar the use of any kind of weapon. It is indeed easier to enforce peace altogether than any lesser limitation of war.
But it is argued that this much may be true nevertheless, that if the nations of the world will agree beforehand not to prepare for particular sorts of war or if they will agree to reduce their military and naval equipment to a minimum, that this will operate powerfully in preventing contraventions and in a phase of popular excitement arresting the rush toward war. The only objection to this admirable proposal is that no power which has desires or rights that can only be satisfied or defended, so far as it knows, by war, will ever enter into such a disarmament agreement in good faith.
目录
本版本内容
- 01INTRODUCTION
- 02I THE IMMENSITY OF THE ISSUE AND THE TRIVIALITY OF MEN
- 03II ARMAMENTS THE FUTILITY OF MERE LIMITATION
- 04III THE TRAIL OF VERSAILLES TWO GREAT POWERS ARE SILENT AND ABSENT
- 05IV THE UNKNOWN SOLDIER OF THE GREAT WAR
- 06V THE PRESIDENT AT ARLINGTON
- 07VI THE FIRST MEETING
- 08VII WHAT IS JAPAN?
- 09VIII CHINA IN THE BACKGROUND
- 10IX THE FUTURE OF JAPAN
- 11X “SECURITY”—THE NEW AND BEAUTIFUL CATCHWORD
- 12XI FRANCE IN THE LIMELIGHT
- 13XII THUS FAR
- 14XIII THE LARGER QUESTION BEHIND THE CONFERENCE
- 15XIV THE REAL THREAT TO CIVILIZATION
- 16XV THE POSSIBLE BREAKDOWN OF CIVILIZATION
- 17XVI WHAT OF AMERICA?
- 18XVII EBB TIDE AT WASHINGTON
- 19XVIII AMERICA AND ENTANGLING ALLIANCES
- 20XIX AN ASSOCIATION OF NATIONS
- 21XX FRANCE AND ENGLAND—THE PLAIN FACTS OF THE CASE
- 22XXI A REMINDER ABOUT WAR
- 23XXII SOME STIFLED VOICES
- 24XXIII INDIA, THE BRITISH EMPIRE AND THE ASSOCIATION OF NATIONS
- 25XXIV THE OTHER END OF PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE—THE SIEVE FOR GOOD INTENTIONS
- 26XXV AFRICA AND THE ASSOCIATION OF NATIONS
- 27XXVI THE FOURTH PLENARY SESSION
- 28XXVII ABOUT THE WAR DEBTS
- 29XXVIII THE FOUNDATION STONE AND THE BUILDING
- 30XXIX WHAT A STABLY ORGANIZED WORLD PEACE MEANS FOR MANKIND