Novum Organum

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NOVUM ORGANUM

BY

LORD BACON

EDITED BY JOSEPH DEVEY, M.A.

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NEW YORK

P. F. COLLIER & SON

22

SCIENCE

NOVUM ORGANUM

OR

TRUE SUGGESTIONS FOR THE INTERPRETATION OF NATURE

PREFACE

They who have presumed to dogmatize on nature, as on some well

investigated subject, either from self-conceit or arrogance, and in the

professorial style, have inflicted the greatest injury on philosophy

and learning. For they have tended to stifle and interrupt inquiry

exactly in proportion as they have prevailed in bringing others to

their opinion: and their own activity has not counterbalanced the

mischief they have occasioned by corrupting and destroying that of

others. They again who have entered upon a contrary course, and

asserted that nothing whatever can be known, whether they have fallen

into this opinion from their hatred of the ancient sophists, or from

the hesitation of their minds, or from an exuberance of learning, have

certainly adduced reasons for it which are by no means contemptible.

They have not, however, derived their opinion from true sources,

and, hurried on by their zeal and some affectation, have certainly

exceeded due moderation. But the more ancient Greeks (whose writings

have perished), held a more prudent mean, between the arrogance of

dogmatism, and the despair of scepticism; and though too frequently

intermingling complaints and indignation at the difficulty of inquiry,

and the obscurity of things, and champing, as it were, the bit, have

still persisted in pressing their point, and pursuing their intercourse

with nature; thinking, as it seems, that the better method was not to

dispute upon the very point of the possibility of anything being known,

but to put it to the test of experience. Yet they themselves, by only

employing the power of the understanding, have not adopted a fixed

rule, but have laid their whole stress upon intense meditation, and a

continual exercise and perpetual agitation of the mind.

Our method, though difficult in its operation, is easily explained.

It consists in determining the degrees of certainty, while we, as it

were, restore the senses to their former rank, but generally reject

that operation of the mind which follows close upon the senses, and

open and establish a new and certain course for the mind from the first

actual perceptions of the senses themselves. This, no doubt, was the

view taken by those who have assigned so much to logic; showing clearly

thereby that they sought some support for the mind, and suspected its

natural and spontaneous mode of action. But this is now employed too

late as a remedy, when all is clearly lost, and after the mind, by

the daily habit and intercourse of life, has come prepossessed with

corrupted doctrines, and filled with the vainest idols. The art of

logic therefore being (as we have mentioned), too late a precaution,

and in no way remedying the matter, has tended more to confirm errors,

than to disclose truth. Our only remaining hope and salvation is to

begin the whole labor of the mind again; not leaving it to itself,

but directing it perpetually from the very first, and attaining our

end as it were by mechanical aid. If men, for instance, had attempted

mechanical labors with their hands alone, and without the power and aid

of instruments, as they have not hesitated to carry on the labors of

their understanding with the unaided efforts of their mind, they would

have been able to move and overcome but little, though they had exerted

their utmost and united powers. And just to pause awhile on this

comparison, and look into it as a mirror; let us ask, if any obelisk of

a remarkable size were perchance required to be moved, for the purpose

of gracing a triumph or any similar pageant, and men were to attempt it

with their bare hands, would not any sober spectator avow it to be an

act of the greatest madness? And if they should increase the number of

workmen, and imagine that they could thus succeed, would he not think

infinity is greater than another, and also that infinity is wasting

away and tending to an end. There is the same difficulty in considering

the infinite divisibility of lines, arising from the weakness of our

minds, which weakness interferes to still greater disadvantage with the

discovery of causes; for although the greatest generalities in nature

must be positive, just as they are found, and in fact not causable,

yet the human understanding, incapable of resting, seeks for something

more intelligible. Thus, however, while aiming at further progress, it

falls back to what is actually less advanced, namely, final causes;

for they are clearly more allied to man’s own nature, than the system

of the universe, and from this source they have wonderfully corrupted

philosophy. But he would be an unskilful and shallow philosopher who

should seek for causes in the greatest generalities, and not be

anxious to discover them in subordinate objects.

XLIX. The human understanding resembles not a dry light, but admits

a tincture of the will and passions, which generate their own

system accordingly; for man always believes more readily that which

he prefers. He, therefore, rejects difficulties for want of patience

in investigation; sobriety, because it limits his hope; the depths of

nature, from superstition; the light of experiment, from arrogance

and pride, lest his mind should appear to be occupied with common

and varying objects; paradoxes, from a fear of the opinion of the

vulgar; in short, his feelings imbue and corrupt his understanding in

innumerable and sometimes imperceptible ways.

L. But by far the greatest impediment and aberration of the human

understanding proceeds from the dulness, incompetence, and errors

of the senses; since whatever strikes the senses preponderates over

everything, however superior, which does not immediately strike them.

Hence contemplation mostly ceases with sight, and a very scanty, or

perhaps no regard is paid to invisible objects. The entire operation,

therefore, of spirits inclosed in tangible bodies is concealed,

and escapes us. All that more delicate change of formation in the

parts of coarser substances (vulgarly called alteration, but in fact

a change of position in the smallest particles) is equally unknown;

and yet, unless the two matters we have mentioned be explored and

brought to light, no great effect can be produced in nature. Again,

the very nature of common air, and all bodies of less density (of

which there are many) is almost unknown; for the senses are weak and

erring, nor can instruments be of great use in extending their sphere

or acuteness--all the better interpretations of nature are worked out

by instances, and fit and apt experiments, where the senses only judge

of the experiment, the experiment of nature and the thing itself.

LI. The human understanding is, by its own nature, prone to

abstraction, and supposes that which is fluctuating to be fixed. But

it is better to dissect than abstract nature: such was the method

employed by the school of Democritus, which made greater progress

in penetrating nature than the rest. It is best to consider matter, its

conformation, and the changes of that conformation, its own action,

and the law of this action or motion; for forms are a mere fiction

of the human mind, unless you will call the laws of action by that

name.

LII. Such are the idols of the tribe, which arise either from the

uniformity of the constitution of man’s spirit, or its prejudices, or

its limited faculties or restless agitation, or from the interference

of the passions, or the incompetence of the senses, or the mode of

their impressions.

LIII. The idols of the den derive their origin from the peculiar nature

of each individual’s mind and body, and also from education, habit, and

accident; and although they be various and manifold, yet we will treat

of some that require the greatest caution, and exert the greatest power